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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  The concept of electronic discovery is still somewhat intimidating to 
many attorneys, but those who have learned to implement electronic 
discovery best practices are enjoying the advantages it offers, which 
include greater control over document review and production processes as 
well as significant cost reductions.  Whether you come to the discovery 
process as in-house or outside counsel, you can anticipate some of the 
issues involved in responding to electronic data requests.  Pre-review 
cooperation among in-house counsel, their litigators, and Information 
Technology (IT) personnel is ideal for planning a successful electronic 
discovery response.  
 
[2]  The abundance of electronic information makes pre-litigation 
planning more important than ever before.  Finding and producing 
information in response to electronic document requests can initially 
appear to be an enormous undertaking, and a disorganized or untimely 
response can have disastrous consequences.  With preparation and the 
proper technology, however, the document review and production process 
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can be easier and more efficient than procedures used in the “paper 
world.”  Counsel can streamline discovery response, minimize its impact 
upon ongoing business operations, reduce costs of review and production, 
and gain a strategic advantage in the process.  Proper planning among 
corporate counsel, IT departments, and outside counsel integrates 
preparation for discovery with daily operations.  Rather than experience a 
crisis when litigation arises, corporate management and its counsel are 
instead ready to respond, leveraging the advantages of electronic 
discovery.   
  
II. DISCOVERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS 
 
[3]  The basic legal framework for electronic discovery is the same as for 
paper documents. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 authorizes requests 
for production of documents, including “electronic data compilations.”1  
Courts now routinely require litigants to demonstrate good faith efforts to 
identify discoverable electronic data, and to inform opposing counsel 
when data is available for production in electronic form.2 
 
[4]  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have not been changed to 
account for electronic data, but the Discovery Subcommittee of the 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure undertook 
substantial work in 2003 to evaluate the need for such changes.3  
Regardless of official rule changes, application of discovery rules to 
electronic documents raises issues unforeseen in the days of paper storage.  
Companies that can expect to receive electronic discovery requests must 
anticipate the need for ready access to responsive information, while 
 
 
 
1
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 
640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (holding that computer records, including those that have been 
“deleted,” are discoverable documents under Rule 34); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 
F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that it is “axiomatic” that electronic data is 
discoverable). 
 
2
 See, e.g., In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., No. 98 Civ. 7161, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26446 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2003); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 
F.R.D. 437 (D.N.J. 2002) (declining to enforce requesting party’s agreement to pay per-
page copy costs where producing party failed to disclose that documents were available 
in electronic form). 
 
3
 As of December, 2003, federal courts in New Jersey, Arkansas, Florida and 
Wyoming had implemented local rules specific to electronic discovery practice.  Ken 
Withers, Electronic Discovery Rules, Proposed Rules, Commentary, and Debate (Dec. 
31, 2003), at http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/toc.html. 
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guarding against creating an overwhelming volume of material to be 
searched. 
 
 
III. DUTY TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCLOSE 
 
[5]  At the commencement of litigation, and before receiving any formal 
discovery request, a party must disclose to opposing parties certain 
information, including a description by category and location of 
documents and data compilations.4  This requirement means that a party 
must search available electronic systems for relevant information.5  
Multiple copies of responsive electronic information may be stored in hard 
drives, networks, backup tapes, laptops, floppy disks, employees’ home 
computers, and PDAs.  How far does the duty to unearth information 
extend? 
  
[6]  GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. examined the duty to investigate 
the existence of electronic information.6  The plaintiffs requested 
information about Wal-Mart’s local sales.7  In responding, Wal-Mart’s 
attorney relied on a senior executive, who indicated that local sales data 
was maintained for five weeks only and was no longer available.8  Wal-
Mart claimed that providing the information would be unduly burdensome 
because it did not have the centralized computer capacity to track the 
information segregated as requested.9  One year later, the plaintiffs 
deposed a Wal-Mart MIS vice president, who testified that Wal-Mart’s 
computers could in fact track the requested information for up to one 
year.10  At the time of plaintiffs’ request, the local sales information was 
segregated and available, but because of the delay caused by counsel’s 
misrepresentation, it was no longer available.11  The court chastised 
counsel for failing to consult MIS personnel: 
 
 
 
 
4
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
 
5
 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 
6
 GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7724, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3804, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000). 
 
7
 Id. 
 
8
 Id. at *4. 
 
9
 Id. 
 
10
 Id. at *5. 
 
11
 Id. 
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Whether or not defendant’s counsel intentionally misled 
plaintiffs, counsel’s inquiries about defendant’s computer 
capacity were certainly deficient . . . .  As a vice president 
in Wal-Mart’s MIS department, she was an obvious person 
with whom defendant’s counsel should have reviewed the 
computer capabilities.12 
 
An on-site inspection of defendant’s computer facilities at Wal-Mart’s 
expense was ordered.13  The court further imposed upon Wal-Mart all the 
plaintiff’s expenses and legal fees caused by the inaccurate disclosure, 
including the cost of the cumbersome process plaintiffs had to use to 
extract the information sought.14  This misstep ultimately cost Wal-Mart 
nearly $110,000.15 
  
[7]  Client information systems yielded another unpleasant surprise in 
Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co.16  Plaintiff’s document request for certain 
emails specifically called for deleted emails available on backup tapes.17  
Defendant Wyeth initially responded, and later confirmed, that it had no 
backup tapes for a particular time frame.18  Months later, Wyeth learned 
that its IT department had in fact preserved over one thousand backup 
tapes holding potentially responsive information, and that the estimated 
cost to restore the tapes would exceed $1 million.19  Though Wyeth’s 
policy was to recycle backup tapes after three months, these tapes had 
been set aside during unrelated litigation.20  As a sanction for its failure to 
disclose the existence of the tapes, “whether unintended or willful,” the 
court imposed upon Wyeth all costs and fees associated with email 
discovery.21 
 
[8]  In addition to mandatory disclosures and responses to specific 
discovery requests, Rule 30(b)(6) provides for deposing a designated IT 
 
 
 
12
 Id. at *6. 
 
13
 Id.  
 
14
 Id.  
 
15
 Id.  
 
16
 Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240 
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 1999). 
 
17
 Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at *7. 
 
18
 Id. 
 
19
 Id. at *12. 
 
20
 Id. at *27. 
 
21
 Id. at *22. 
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person in order to obtain discovery of an opponent’s computer systems.22  
Deposing a designated IT person may provide substantive information 
about systems and document management protocols that could shape 
further discovery.23 
 
IV. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY 
 
[9]  Rule 26(b)(2) provides protection from unduly burdensome or 
expensive discovery requests.24  A court may deny a discovery request or 
require a requesting party to pay expenses if the burden or expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs any likely benefits.25  As courts become 
more experienced with electronic discovery, they will expect litigants to 
demonstrate a reasoned approach to electronic document requests.  
Electronic discovery requests that are not sufficiently tailored to identify 
potentially relevant information will be denied.26 
  
[10]  When a requesting party demonstrates a good faith effort to furnish 
reasonably tailored electronic discovery requests, courts will hold the 
responding party to a higher standard in providing a full response.27  A 
party unable to readily produce responsive data may open itself to 
intrusive measures; for example, the court may order that an opponent’s 
expert be given direct access to its computers.28  However, at least one 
 
 
 
22
 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). 
 
23
 See, e.g., Alexander v. FBI, 188 F.R.D. 111, 119 (D.D.C. 1998) (permitting a 
deposition to learn about email systems and systems for acquisition, location, and 
disposition of computers to guide substantive discovery); In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. 
Antitrust Litig., 155 F.R.D. 209, 214 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (explaining that in order to access 
the information necessary to proceed with substantive discovery, information about data 
maintained on defendants’ computers, including hardware and software, should be 
acquired through depositions). 
 
24
 FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
 
25
 Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 
1985)). 
 
26
 See, e.g., Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 
2003) (finding that plaintiff’s request was broad and unduly burdensome). 
 
27
 Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 
2002) (stating that sanctions, including an adverse inference jury instruction, may be 
given when ordinary negligence leads to a failure to produce electronic information). 
 
28
 Playboy Entm’t, Inc, v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1052-53 (S.D. Cal. 1999) 
(ordering such an inspection after the defendant testified that she routinely deleted emails 
and could not retrieve them); see also Procter & Gamble v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 632 
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court has interpreted Rule 34 to require some showing of non-compliance 
with discovery obligations before an opponent will be allowed direct 
access to a company’s computer databases.29 
  
[11]  If a corporation’s own actions contribute to its discovery difficulties, 
it is especially unlikely that a court will be sympathetic to pleas for 
relief.30  In In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, the 
defendant acknowledged that part of its problem retrieving stored 
information was the limitations of the software it was using.31  The court 
reasoned that it would be unfair to impose upon plaintiffs the cost of 
defendant’s choice of an inferior electronic storage media.32  As in matters 
involving paper discovery, courts are unimpressed with vague claims that 
a particular request is unduly burdensome.33 
 
V. COST-SHIFTING 
 
[12]  In the context of electronic discovery, questions of undue burden and 
expense typically arise when a request calls for data that is not readily 
retrievable. For example, data that has been “deleted” is not readily 
retrievable because it is stored only on backup tapes, on outdated systems, 
or is no longer available in electronic form.  Production might require, for 
                                                                                                                     
(D. Utah 1998) (allowing a keyword search of opposing party’s database to extract 
relevant information). 
 
29
 In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 
30
 See, e.g., Itzenson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 99-4475, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14680, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2000) (stating that defendant’s assertion that it 
could not retrieve certain statistics was “difficult to believe … in the computer era”); 
Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 340, 354 (Ohio Ct. Com. 
Pl. Lucas County 1996) (preventing defendant from “frustrat[ing] discovery of relevant 
material because the method it has chosen to store documents makes it burdensome to 
retrieve them”); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *6 (E.D. Ill. June 13, 1995) (suggesting defendant should 
pay to devise email-retrieval program because this expense was “a product of the 
defendant’s record-keeping scheme”). 
 
31
 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *6. 
 
32
 Id.  
 
33
 Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(providing for plaintiff’s expert’s access to defendant’s hard drive when defendant 
provided “extremely sparse” information about computers and networks involved in the 
dispute, resulting in potential costs or business disruptions for the procedure); Zonaras v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., No. C-3-94-161, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22535, at *11-*12 (S.D. 
Ohio 1996) (compelling production of electronic crash test results over “unspecified 
burden” claimed by defendant). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume X, Issue 5 
 
 
example, restoration of backup tapes or creation of programs to search for 
and retrieve responsive data.  In such circumstances, producing parties 
frequently argue that costs of production should be shifted to requesting 
parties. 
 
[13]  Such efforts to shift costs have traditionally yielded mixed results.  
Some courts have ordered the requesting party to pay extraordinary costs 
of production.34  Others have required parties to restore responsive 
information at their own expense, denying claims that substantial costs 
involved were “undue.”35  In Linnen, defendant Wyeth estimated that 
restoring backup tapes containing potentially relevant information could 
cost over $1 million.36  The court deferred ruling on restoration of all the 
tapes, awaiting results of a sampling, but indicated that Wyeth would be 
required to bear the cost.37  The court reasoned that it would be unfair for a 
corporation to enjoy the benefits of technology and also to use it as a 
shield in litigation.38 
 
[14]  More recently, case law on the subject of cost allocation 
demonstrates courts’ efforts to develop a methodical approach to 
electronic discovery disputes. 39  The Zubulake decision instructs that the 
following three-step analysis is required in disputes involving the scope 
and cost of discovery of electronic data: 
 
(1) The court must thoroughly understand the responding 
party’s computer system, both with respect to active and 
stored data.  For data kept in an accessible format, the usual 
 
 
 
34
 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94-Civ. 2120, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16355, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (noting that further rulings will require 
plaintiff’s willingness to pay defendant’s costs in creating computer programs to extract 
requested data); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 F.R.D. 634, 639 
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (ordering requesting party to pay for creation of computer tape). 
 
35
 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at 
*5 (requiring producing party to develop, at own expense, a retrieval program to access 
emails from backup tapes, though estimated cost was $50,000 to $70,000). 
 
36
 Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, 
at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 1999). 
 
37
 Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at *11. 
 
38
 Id. at *7. 
 
39
 The Zubulake decision signaled a fundamental shift in how attorneys, litigants, and 
the courts must approach electronic discovery.  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 
F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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rules of discovery apply and the responding party will be 
required to pay for production. The court should consider 
shifting costs only when inaccessible data is at issue.  
(2) Because the cost-shifting analysis is so fact-intensive, 
the court must determine what data may be found on the 
inaccessible media.  A “sampling” approach is sensible in 
most cases.  
(3) In conducting the cost-shifting analysis, a seven-factor 
test should be applied.40   
 
[15]  The new seven-factor test represents a modification of the widely 
followed cost-shifting analysis set forth in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, Inc.41  The seven-factor cost-shifting test follows 
the initial three-step analysis: 
 
(1) The extent to which the request is specifically tailored 
to discover relevant information,  
 
(2) The availability of such information from other sources, 
 
(3) The total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
controversy, 
 
(4) The total cost of production, compared to the resources 
available to each party, 
 
(5) The relative ability of each party to control costs and its 
incentive to do so, 
 
(6) The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, 
and 
 
(7) The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information.42 
 
 
 
 
40
 Id. at 352. 
 
41
 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8308, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002). 
 
42
 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
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The Zubulake court instructed that the seven factors should not be 
weighted equally.43  Instead, the central question must be whether the 
request imposes an undue burden or expense on the requesting party - or, 
stated differently, “[H]ow important is the sought-after evidence in 
comparison to the cost of production?”44 
 
[16]  The court stated that the first two factors - comprising a “marginal 
utility” test - are the most important.45  The second part of the analysis 
should consider factors three, four, and five in making a determination of 
expense and relative ability to bear the burden of the expense.46  The court 
further stated that factor six, which considers the importance of the 
litigation itself, must stand on its own and has the potential to predominate 
over the other factors when it comes into play.47   Finally, factor seven was 
listed as the least important because of the general presumption that the 
response to a discovery request will generally [this is an important 
distinction] benefit the requesting party.48 
 
VI. FORM OF PRODUCTION 
 
[17]  A producing party should not expect to meet discovery obligations 
by providing hard copies of electronic data.  Data is discoverable in 
computerized form even if the same information has already been 
produced on paper.49  While computer-based documents may be 
technically usable in printed form, they are unnecessarily cumbersome for 
a requesting party to review.  When further analysis would entail 
substantial costs in re-inputting data, courts have ordered producing 
parties to provide materials in computer-readable form.50  Production in a 
 
 
 
43
 Id. 
 
44
 Id. at 323. 
 
45
 Id.  
 
46
 Id. 
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
 Id. 
 
49
 In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 441 (D.N.J. 2002); see 
also, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16355 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (holding that the production of information in hard copy 
documentary form did not preclude a party from receiving that same information in 
computerized or electronic form). 
 
50
 Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 
(E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 F.R.D. 634, 636 
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (ordering defendant to provide on computer tape material already 
produced in printed form). 
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form directly readable by the adverse party’s computers is decidedly the 
“preferred alternative.”51 
 
[18]  In Bristol-Myers Squibb, plaintiffs and defendants initially entered an 
agreement regarding copying costs.52  The plaintiffs were to pay ten cents 
per page for documents defendants copied for production.53  After the 
defendants produced a significant quantity of paper and delivered the bill, 
plaintiffs disputed how much they actually owed.54  Defendants moved for 
an order seeking reimbursement in the amount of ten cents per page 
produced, as originally agreed upon by plaintiffs.55  The plaintiffs had 
some objections.56  Though Bristol-Myers Squibb was producing 
documents it had stored in both paper and electronic form, it produced all 
documents to the plaintiffs in paper form.57  Defendants scanned 
documents stored in paper form to create electronic images for its own 
review, while “blowing back” paper copies for production to the 
plaintiffs.58 
 
[19]  With respect to the documents that were stored electronically, the 
plaintiffs argued that those documents stored in electronic form should 
have been produced in electronic form.59 The court noted that the plaintiffs 
specifically asked for paper, even after the court raised the issue of 
electronic information at a case management conference.60  The plaintiffs 
“had every opportunity” to request electronic information, but they did so 
only after receiving the bill for paper production.61  Nevertheless, the court 
sided with the plaintiffs on this issue.  The court found it “somewhat 
troublesome” that the defendants had responsive information in electronic 
form but produced it on paper.62  The court held that the defendants fell 
short of their Rule 26 disclosure obligations by not telling the plaintiffs 
 
 
 
51
 Nat’l Union Elec. Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1262. 
 
52
 In re Bristol-Myers Squib, 205 F.R.D. at 439. 
 
53
 Id. 
 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 Id. at 438-39. 
 
56
 Id. at 439. 
 
57
 Id. 
 
58
 Id.  
 
59
 Id. at 440. 
 
60
 Id. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume X, Issue 5 
 
 
that the information was available in electronic form.63  The plaintiffs 
were not required to pay the costs of copying paper because the defendants 
did not tell the plaintiffs that requested documents were available in 
electronic form.64 
 
VII. DOCUMENT RETENTION AND SPOLIATION 
 
[20]  Besides anticipating the logistics of discovery response, a 
corporation must consider its legal duty to preserve evidence.65  The duty 
to preserve evidence applies to electronic evidence as well as to paper.66 
 
[21]  Once litigation is pending or imminent, a party must take affirmative 
measures to preserve potential evidence that might otherwise be destroyed 
in the course of business.67  Usual procedures for data destruction or 
recycling may have to be suspended.  In Procter & Gamble, for example, 
the company initially disclosed that emails of five key employees might be 
relevant.68  Then, however, it failed to preserve the emails.69 Though the 
court had not issued a specific preservation order, it imposed a $10,000 
fine for this “sanctionable breach of P&G’s discovery duties.”70 
 
[22]  In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practice 
Litigation71 illustrates the duty to preserve electronic evidence.  
 
 
 
63
 Id. 
 
64
 Id. at 440-41. 
 
65
 Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
if a corporation knows or should know that particular documents may eventually become 
material, it must preserve them). 
 
66
 Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16900, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2000); see Procter & Gamble v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 
632 (D. Utah 1998); William T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 
1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
 
67
 See Danis, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16900, at *96-100.  “[T]he duty to preserve 
documents in the face of pending litigation is not a passive obligation.  Rather it must be 
discharged actively.”  Id. 
 
68
 Procter & Gamble, 179 F.R.D. at 631. 
 
69
 Id. 
 
70
 Id. at 632; see also Applied Telematics, Inc., v. Sprint Communications Co., No. 
94-4603, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14053, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1996) (finding Sprint’s 
normal procedure of recycling backup tapes should have been suspended during 
litigation); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
240 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 1999) (finding defendant’s customary recycling of backup 
tapes to be “inexcusable conduct” when it continued after plaintiffs’ discovery request). 
 
71
 169 F.R.D. 598 (D.N.J. 1997). 
  
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume X, Issue 5 
 
 
Prudential, alleged to have engaged in deceptive sales practices, was 
ordered to preserve all potentially relevant records.  In spite of the order, 
its employees in at least four locations destroyed outdated sales 
materials.72  Further discovery revealed that Prudential had distributed 
document retention instructions to agents and employees via email; 
however, some employees lacked access to email and others routinely 
ignored it.73  Prudential also distributed a hard copy memorandum, but did 
not distribute it universally.74  Furthermore, senior executives never 
directed distribution of the court’s order to all employees.75 
 
[23]  The court found Prudential’s efforts were inadequate, noting the lack 
of a “clear and unequivocal document preservation policy.”76  Though the 
court found no willful misconduct, it nevertheless inferred that the lost 
materials were relevant and would have reflected negatively on 
Prudential.77  Citing Prudential’s “gross negligence” and “haphazard and 
uncoordinated approach,” the court imposed a sanction of $1 million.78 
 
[24]  More recently, the Zubulake court examined the standards for 
spoliation of information stored on backup tapes: 
 
Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of 
litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every email or 
electronic document, and every backup tape?  The answer 
is clearly, ‘no’.  Such a rule would cripple large 
corporations, like UBS, that are almost always involved in 
litigation.  As a general rule, then, a party need not preserve 
all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates 
litigation.79 
 
However, the court noted that anyone who is a party or anticipates being a 
party to a lawsuit “must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might 
 
 
 
72
 Id. at 613. 
 
73
 Id. at 612. 
 
74
 Id.  
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 Id. at 615. 
 
77
  Id. at 615-16. 
 
78
 Id. at 615-17. 
 
79
 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, No. 02 Civ. 1243, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18771, 
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2003). 
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be useful to an adversary.”80  Noting that the duty to preserve extends to 
all employees likely to have relevant information, or the “key players” in 
the case, the court determined that all the individuals whose backup tapes 
were lost fell into this category in this case.81 
 
[25]  In assessing the duty of a litigant to preserve evidence, the court 
noted that electronic data presents some unique issues: 
 
A party or anticipated party must retain all relevant 
documents (but not multiple identical copies) in existence 
at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant 
documents created thereafter.  In recognition of the fact that 
there are many ways to manage electronic data, litigants are 
free to choose how this task is accomplished.82 
 
[26]  The court went on to summarize a party’s preservation obligations 
with regard to electronic data in general, and backup tapes in particular: 
 
The scope of a party’s preservation obligation can be 
described as follows: Once a party reasonably anticipates 
litigation, it must suspend its routine document 
retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation 
hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.  As 
a general rule, that litigation hold does not apply to 
inaccessible backup tapes (e.g. those typically maintained 
solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which may 
continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the 
company’s policy.  On the other hand, if backup tapes are 
accessible (i.e. actively used for information retrieval), then 
such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation hold.  
However, it does make sense to create one exception to this 
general rule.  If a company can identify where particular 
employee documents are stored on backup tapes, then the 
tapes storing the documents of ‘key players’ to the existing 
or threatened litigation should be preserved if the 
 
 
 
80
 Id. at *13. 
 
81
 Id. at *14. 
 
82
 Id. at *15. 
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information contained on those tapes is not otherwise 
available.  This exception applies to all backup tapes.83 
 
Though they may harshly punish litigants for failure to preserve evidence, 
courts also recognize that certain documents are destroyed in the ordinary 
course of business.84 Not every missing document supports a finding of 
spoliation.  No unfavorable inference can be drawn from destruction of 
documents when the circumstances properly account for it.85 A party may 
defeat a claim of spoliation by showing that evidence was destroyed 
pursuant to a valid and consistently enforced document management 
policy.86 The basic standard, set forth in Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., is 
whether a document retention policy is reasonable.87  
  
[27]  In Lewy, the defendant firearms manufacturer had destroyed 
customer complaints and gun examination reports pursuant to its records 
retention policy.88 The court delineated factors that help determine 
whether destruction pursuant to such a policy justified a “negative 
inference instruction.”89  Specifically, the court remanded the case with 
instructions to consider: (1) whether the policy was reasonable given the 
facts and circumstances of the relevant documents; (2) whether lawsuits or 
complaints had been filed, and the frequency and magnitude of any such 
complaints; and (3) whether the policy was instituted in bad faith, to limit 
evidence available to potential plaintiffs.90 The court emphasized that 
whatever the dictates of a corporate policy, a corporation must preserve 
those documents that it knows or should know may become material in 
 
 
 
83
 Id. at *16-*17. 
 
84
 See, e.g., Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 1999 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 240 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 1999) (noting that recycling of backup tapes is, 
under normal circumstances, a “widely accepted business practice”). 
 
85
 Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Gumbs 
v. International Harvester Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983)); Crescendo Invs., Inc. v. 
Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 479 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (noting party’s testimony that he 
routinely deleted emails after reading them supported finding he had no fraudulent 
intent). 
 
86
 See Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1984) 
(explaining court is not holding that the good faith disposal of documents pursuant to a 
bona fide, consistent and reasonable document retention policy can not be a valid 
justification for a failure to produce documents in discovery). 
 
87
 Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112. 
 
88
 Id. at 1111. 
 
89
 Id. at 1112. 
 
90
 Id. 
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litigation.91  A company cannot shield itself with a policy of wholesale 
document destruction.92 
 
VIII. TEN TIPS FOR IMPLEMENTING ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY BEST PRACTICES 
 
[28]  Keeping up with the quickly changing law of electronic discovery is 
a good start, but knowing how to put these lessons to work in practice is 
the key to conducting electronic discovery successfully.  Effective 
planning requires a new working relationship among internal and external 
legal and technical resources. 
 
[29] A. Inside Counsel 
 
1. Consider implementing a formal document retention policy to 
formalize rules for saving and destroying electronic documents.  
Be sure that the policy includes electronic information, and that 
employees understand the purpose of the policy and the 
importance of compliance.  If your company opts not to formalize 
such a protocol, be sure you have outlined the pros and cons of this 
decision for the management team. 
  
2. Focus on making litigation preparedness a part of employees’ daily 
work.  Increase company-wide awareness of the types of 
information that must be disclosed in litigation.   Educate all 
employees about the pitfalls of carelessly destroying or retaining 
information.  Train employees to document and store their work in 
an organized (and ultimately defensible) fashion. 
  
3. Establish an ongoing working relationship between in-house legal 
and IT personnel.  Provide guidance to IT personnel about 
document retention and destruction and enforcement of a formal 
document retention policy if one is in place.  Make IT employees 
aware of the most common electronic data problems: retaining 
unnecessary information for too long, or failing to retain 
 
 
 
91
 Id.  
 
92
 Id.; see also Carlucci, 102 F.R.D. at 486 (entering default judgment where stated 
purpose of document policy was to destroy documents that might prove detrimental in 
litigation). 
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information that the company has an obligation to keep.  Striking 
the right balance here is critical to avoiding problems in court. 
  
4. Organize data storage efforts and establish systems that simplify 
later identification, retrieval, and production of responsive 
information.  Talk to IT personnel about the implications of 
choosing software and changing systems.  Consider capabilities 
that may be relevant to a discovery response: How is data stored?  
In what format is it stored?  Is it accessible or inaccessible?  Do 
you want to have ready access to information from systems no 
longer in use? 
  
5. To preserve evidence when necessary, outline a specific plan for 
the suspension of usual document destruction and backup tape 
recycling protocols.  Identify key employees from the legal and IT 
department to be involved as soon as litigation is pending or 
imminent.   Determine how best to distribute evidence preservation 
instructions to all employees, and ensure that enforcement 
mechanisms are in place. 
 
6. Designate and train an IT representative to act as the company’s 
30(b)(6) deposition witness when electronic data storage may be at 
issue.  Advise key IT employees that clear communication with 
outside counsel will be necessary to properly respond to electronic 
document requests. 
 
[30] B. Outside Counsel 
 
7. Expand working knowledge of client operations to include client 
information systems:  What information is maintained?  How is it 
stored?  What will be the procedures for and costs of retrieval if an 
electronic discovery request is received?  With a solid working 
knowledge of client systems, outside counsel will be equipped to 
establish discovery parameters with opposing counsel early in the 
case and challenge overbroad requests if necessary. 
 
8. Maintain a focus on minimizing disruption of client operations.  
Work with IT personnel and inside counsel to reduce the time 
individual employees must divert to examining their files for 
responsive information.  Know how to use technology to protect 
employees’ time and produce timely, accurate responses.  Prompt 
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and complete discovery responses can prevent the imposition of 
intrusive measures, such as on-site inspections. 
 
9. Before and after a document request is received, adequately 
explain the scope of the obligation to preserve electronic data and 
the duty to search different systems and storage media.  Do not 
expect a written document request to be self-explanatory.  Be a 
partner in the data retrieval process, not just the vehicle for the 
message. 
 
10. Become acquainted with key IT personnel.  Educate them about 
the types of documents most frequently requested in litigation as 
well as questions they can expect if deposed.  Prepare with them to 
make a prompt and thorough inventory of stored information when 
litigation arises. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
[31]  While electronic discovery disasters such as crushing costs, harsh 
sanctions, and even default judgments can strike the unready, great 
benefits are available to those who prepare.   In-house counsel, litigation 
attorneys, and IT personnel all have roles to play.  Electronic discovery 
response planning is not just a matter of gathering responsive information, 
but of working in advance to control what information is created and how 
it is stored.  
 
[32]  Electronic discovery best practices begin with making data 
management a part of daily business operations.  Attorneys cannot 
accomplish this objective without involving IT personnel, and IT 
personnel cannot properly maintain electronic data without guidance from 
counsel about what should be kept or destroyed.  Outside counsel can help 
by providing ongoing advice about the law of electronic discovery and 
what to expect in the process.  
  
[33]  As a part of discovery planning, attorneys and IT personnel should 
also educate themselves about how available technology can streamline 
the discovery process.  When litigation arises, they can take advantage of 
technology to gather and review information without substantially 
disrupting operations.  Technology exists to provide lawyers with tools 
and resources to handle complex discovery in a speedy, cost-efficient 
manner without interrupting the workflow of familiar business and 
  
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume X, Issue 5 
 
 
discovery practices.  With the use of such tools, in-house lawyers can gain 
control over data retrieval and review processes, while outside counsel can 
enjoy a tremendous advantage in preparing client cases for the best 
resolution. 
